A Republic, If You Can Keep It (Part 2)

The Soviet Union’s acquisition of the A-bomb in 1949 did not change the equation or gainsay the case that the entanglements of the Marshall Plan and NATO were a mistake. Crucially, neither did it create a military requirement for US air bases in Europe or alliances with European countries. Home territories and the open oceans and skies turned out to be more than adequate for basing the nuclear arsenals of both sides, as the Cuban Missile Crisis fully clarified.

Indeed, once both sides had the A-bomb the age of nuclear deterrence or MAD (mutual assured destruction) commenced. Notwithstanding the fringe views of Dr. Strangelove types like Herman Khan, nuclear war was soon deemed to be unwinnable and the focus shifted to the ability to reliably deliver a devastating second strike in response to a potential nuclear provocation.

This “assured” destruction was itself the defense against nuclear attack. But to be an effective deterrent the opposing side had to believe that its opponent’s ability to deliver was operationally full-proof and highly certain to happen.

In this respect during the strategic bomber age of the 1950s the US had such deterrence capacity early on—with long-range strategic bombers capable of reaching the Soviet Union and returning with mid-air refueling. These strategic bombers including the B-50 Superfortress and the B-36 Peacemaker had impressive range capabilities, with the latter reaching 10,000 miles.

However, it was the introduction of the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress in 1955 that removed any doubt. The B-52 had a range of nearly 9,000 miles without aerial refueling, even as it carried a payload of A-bombs far heavier than any previous aircraft, was powered by far more reliable engines and could attain altitudes beyond the reach of interdiction.

As it happened, the Soviets were late to the strategic bomber game, even after they detonated a serviceable nuke in August 1949. At the time and for several years to follow the Soviets relied upon the Tupolev Tu-4 to deliver their A-bombs, which was a reverse-engineered copy of America’s earlier, far less capable B-29. Accordingly, the Soviet bombers faced significant challenges, including limited range and payload capacity, which made it difficult to deliver a meaningful number of nukes to the U.S. without risking detection and interception.

When the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile age (ICBM) materialized in the second half of the 1950s, the Soviets were the first to demonstrate a successful ICBM, the R-7 Semyorka in mid-1957. Yet not withstanding the vaunted “missile gap” charge by JFK during the 1960 campaign, the Soviet Union had only deployed 4 of these ICBMs by 196o.

The United States did not conduct its own first successful ICBM tests until October 1959. But by the end of the following year it had deployed approximately 20 Atlas ICBMs, which figure grew to 129 ICBMs by the peak of the liquid fueled rocket era in 1962.